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Abstract. Searchable encryption schemes allow users to perform keyword based
searches on an encrypted database. Almost all existing such schemes only con-
sider the scenario where a single user acts as both the data owner and the querier.
However, most databases in practice do not just serve one user; instead, they
support search and write operations by multiple users. In this paper, we system-
atically study searchable encryption in a practical multi-user setting. Our results
include a set of security notions for multi-user searchable encryption as well as
a construction which is provably secure under the newly introduced security no-
tions.
1 Introduction
With the prevalence of network connectivity, a typical paradigm of many enterprise
database applications is for multiple users to access a shared database via a local area
network or the Internet. For business-critical or security-sensitive data, encryption is
often used as the last line of defense to combat unsolicited data accesses. Consider
the following application example. A federation of healthcare institutes plans to estab-
lish a medical database so that their medical practitioners and researchers can share
clinic records and research results. To reduce the operational cost, management of the
database is outsourced to a database service provider. The database is encrypted in or-
der to comply with patient privacy related laws, such as HIPPA in the United States,
and yet the encrypted database must be searchable by authorized users.
Searchable encryption is a cryptographic primitive that enables users to perform
keyword-based searches on an encrypted database just as in normal database transac-
tions [8, 10, 12, 19]. However, all the existing schemes are limited to the single-user
setting where the database owner who generates the database is also the single user to
perform searches on it. To support multi-user searches, Curtmola et. al. [8], by directly
extending their single-user schemes, suggest to share the secret key for database search-
ing among all users. Their scheme allows only one user to write to the database, though
multiple users are able to search. Unfortunately, many practical applications (e.g., the
aforementioned healthcare federation example) require a database to support both write
and search operations by multiple users. Moreover, user revocation in their scheme is
based on broadcast encryption, where a revocation affects all non-revoked users.
Extending a single-user scheme to a full-fledged multi-user scheme by sharing se-
cret keys (or the private keys of public key based systems (see Section 2)) among all
users is a naı¨ve approach with several serious shortcomings. First, there is no feasible
means to determine the originator of a query in a provable manner, since all queries
are generated from the same key. This becomes unacceptable when accountability of
queries is desired by the database application. Secondly, user revocation can be pro-
hibitively expensive. In a multi-user application, user revocation is a routine procedure.
For a key-sharing based scheme, revocation often implies a new round of key distri-
bution involving all non-revoked users. Obviously, this is not scalable for large and
dynamic systems where user revocation may occur frequently. One may suggest us-
ing access control to complement key sharing in order to address the problem of user
revocation (i.e., user revocation does not entail key renewal). However, deployment of
access control in practice is prohibitively expensive as pointed out in [8], and worse yet,
users have to maintain an additional set of secrets. Thirdly, many searchable encryption
schemes follow the symmetric access paradigm, i.e., the same key is used for index
generation and search. Therefore, once a revoked user breaks the security perimeter of
a database system and gains illegal access to the encrypted database, she is still able to
search it at her will. One remedy could be to update the indexes after every user revo-
cation. However, it is obviously infeasible for large databases due to the immense cost
it entails.
In this paper, we systematically study searchable encryption in the multi-user set-
ting. We formulate a system model and define its security requirements. We also pro-
pose an efficient construction, which offers not only the conventional query privacy, but
also the following new features.
- Our system allows a group of users, each possessing a distinct secret key, to insert
their encrypted data records to the database while every user in the group is able
to search all the records using her chosen keywords with the assistance from a
semi-trusted database server.
- Our system allows the user management of the database owner organization to dy-
namically and efficiently revoke users. Our revocation does not require distribution
of new keys, nor needs to update the encrypted database including the indexes. Af-
ter a revocation, the revoked users are no longer able to search the database, while
the revocation process is transparent to those non-revoked users. Our system also
allows for dynamic user enrollment, since a user joining does not affect other user’s
settings.
- Our system offers query unforgeability in the sense that neither a dishonest user nor
the database server is able to generate valid queries on behalf of another user unless
her secret key is compromised.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss the
related work and highlight the difference between our work and other searchable en-
cryption schemes. Then, we define the system and formulate security requirements in
Section 3. Our proposed construction, together with a rigorous security analysis and
a performance evaluation, are presented in Section 4. Concluding remarks are in Sec-
tion 5.
2 Related Work
Our work is under the umbrella of searchable encryption, which in general allows a
user to search among encrypted data and find the data containing a chosen keyword.
The first practical scheme of this kind is due to Song et al [19], who consider searches
across encrypted keywords within a file with an overhead linear to the file size. Goh [12]
and Chang and Mitzenmacher [10] propose to search encrypted indexes of a set of doc-
uments. Their approaches improve the search efficiency at the cost of a large storage for
the constructed indexes (the bit-length of the index for each document is proportional
to the total number of keywords). A formal security notion of searchable encryption
is defined in [8] which also constructs schemes provably secure against non-adaptive
and adaptive adversaries. Yang et al [20] apply the concept of searchable encryption to
dynamic databases. The work of [4] considers the variation of simultaneous search of
conjunctive keywords.
The first public-key based searchable encryption scheme is due to Boneh et al [2],
where the private key holder can perform a search among messages encrypted under
the corresponding public key. Park et al [18] and Hwang et al [15] propose variations of
conjunctive keywords search in the public key setting. Abdalla et al [1] further analyze
the consistency property of public key based searchable encryption, and demonstrate a
generic construction by transforming an anonymous identity-based encryption scheme.
Note that while public key based schemes allow for multi-user writing, only the key
holder who knows the private key can perform searches. As a result, applying public
key based searchable encryption schemes to the multi-user setting would face the same
problem as that of symmetric key based ones. Although Curtmola et al. suggest in [8] to
employ broadcast encryption to allow multiple user search, it only allows a single user
to write to the database. Moreover, their scheme is more suitable for a static collection
of documents than a dynamic database. By contrast, our work in this paper studies
searchable encryption in database applications where a group of users share data in a
way that all users are able to write to and search an encrypted database without sharing
their secrets.
3 Model and Definitions
3.1 System Model
We consider a database system {D, UM, Serv, U}, where D is a database; UM is the
user manager of the data owner organization that is responsible for the management of
users, e.g., user enrolment and user revocation; Serv is the database server providing
the search service; U is a group of users.
The database D consists of m records {d1, · · · , dm} of multiple attributes. One of
the attributes is the keyword used for search (note that it is straightforward to consider
multiple keyword attributes). The domain of the keyword attribute is denoted by W .
The keyword of di is denoted by di.w. Serv does not host the database D directly;
instead, it hosts an encrypted version of D, denoted by D′ = {d′1, · · · , d′m}, where
d′i = 〈E(di), I(di.w)〉: the first component is an encryption of di and the second is the
output of an index generation function I(·) on di.w. Let ED = {E(d1), · · · , E(dm)}
and ID = {I(d1.w), · · · , I(dm.w)}.
With the assistance of Serv, an authorized user u ∈ U , is allowed to insert data
records to D′ and to search data records including those inserted by others based on her
chosen keywords. We use qu(w) to denote a query from user u on keyword w ∈ W . On
receiving query q = qu(w), Serv is expected to return aq = {E(di) | di ∈ D, di.w =
w}. Whenever necessary, UM may revoke a user’s privilege of searching the database.
Therefore, the user set U is divided into an authorized user set UA and a revoked user
set UR. Only users in UA are allowed to successfully search and write to the database.
UM is an offline user manager of the data owner organization and is responsible for
user enrollment and revocation; therefore we assume that UM is trusted and all inter-
actions with UM are secure (Please do not confuse UM with the system administrator
of the database server). We consider a semi-trusted Serv as in [13], in the sense that
it does not deviate from the prescribed protocol execution while it may try to derive as
much information as possible from user queries and database access patterns. In partic-
ular, we assume that it will not launch active attacks such as collusion with users. Our
trust model for Serv is based on the following observation. In practice, most database
hosting services are run by large and reputable IT service providers which clearly un-
derstand the paramount importance of corporate reputation for business success. There-
fore, it is logical to assume that the database hosting server follows trusted-but-curious
(semi-trusted) behavior. Active attacks are easy to detect/notice and therefore risk the
server from being caught. Even a rumor of violation of rules will result in very bad
publicity and damage a company’s reputation.
Throughout the rest of the paper, we use the following notations. For a set S, we
write x ∈R S to denote that x is selected uniformly at random from S, and write |S| to
denote the size of S. For an algorithm A, x ← A denotes that A outputs x. A function
ν : N → [0, 1] is negligible if for any polynomial p, there exists kp ∈ N such that for
all k ≥ kp, ν(k) ≤ 1/p(k). For convenience of reference, other notations used in the
sequel are listed in Table 1.
Notation Semantic
kUM the secret key of UM
e the encryption key for record encryption
qku, ComKu user u’s query key and her complementary key, respectively
U-ComK a list of 2-tuples (u,ComKu) maintained by Serv
Table 1. Notations
3.2 Definitions
We now define the multi-user encrypted database system and its security notions. A
multi-user encrypted database system, denoted by Γ , consists of the following algo-
rithms:
– Setup(1κ). A probabilistic algorithm executed by UM to set up the system and
to initialize system-wide parameters, where κ is the security parameter. The algo-
rithm outputs a secret key kUM for UM and the record encryption key e for a
semantically secure symmetric key encryption scheme.
– Enroll(kUM , u). Executed by UM to enroll user u to the system. Taking as in-
put kUM and user identity u, it outputs a pair of query key and complementary
key (qku, ComKu) for u. qku and e are then securely transported to user u, and
ComKu is securely passed to Serv who then updates the U-ComK list by inserting
a new entry (u,ComKu).
– GenIndex(qku, w;ComKu). An interactive algorithm run between user u and
Serv to generate an index for keyword w. User u sends an index request on w
to Serv, who then computes a response using the corresponding ComKu. Finally,
u outputs I(w) based on Serv’s response.
– Write(qku, e, di;ComKu). Run between user u and Serv to write an encrypted
record d′i to D
′. The user u first invokes GenIndex(qku, di.w;ComKu) to gener-
ate I(di.w), then computesE(di) using e, and finally passes d′i = 〈E(di), I(di.w)〉
to Serv which appends it to D′.
– ConstructQ(qku, w). Run by a user u to construct a query. It takes as input the
secret query key qku and a chosen keyword w, and outputs a query qu(w).
– Search(qu(w), ComKu, D′). Run by Serv to searchD′ for records containing w.
Namely, on a query qu(w), it outputs aq = {E(di) | di ∈ D, di.w = w}.
– Revoke(u). Run by UM to evict a user from the system. On an input user identity
u, it revokes u’s search capability. As a result, UA = UA \ {u}, UR = UR ∪ {u},
and u is no longer able to search the database.
A multi-user encrypted database system Γ is correct if an authorized user can al-
ways get the correct query reply. More formally, ∀u ∈ UA,∀w ∈ W ,
Search(ConstructQ(qku, w), ComKu, D′) = {E(di) | di ∈ D, di.w = w}.
We also formalize several security requirements of the multi-user encrypted database
system, including query privacy, query unforgeability and revocability.
Query Privacy A common security requirement for all searchable encryption schemes
is query privacy, which is a security notion on the amount of information leakage to the
server regarding user queries. As discussed in [8], any searchable encryption scheme
inevitably reveals certain query traces (defined shortly) to the server, unless using the
private information retrieval techniques, or PIR for short [9]. We refer interested readers
to [3, 9, 16, 17] for various discussions on PIR. For searchable encryption, the server
always observes the database access patterns (e.g. two queries have the same reply),
albeit the server is unable to determine the keyword in a query. However, apart from the
information that can be acquired via observation and the information derived from it,
no other information should be exposed to the server.
For a record di, we use id(di) to denote the identifying information that is uniquely
associated with di, such as its database position or its memory location. For a query q
and its reply (i.e., the outputs of Search) aq , we define Ω(q) = {uq, id(aq)}, where
uq is the issuer of q and id(aq) represents the identifying information of each record
in aq . Let Qt = (q1, · · · , qt) be a sequence of t queries from the user group, and let
Wt = (w1, w2..., wt) be the corresponding queried keywords, andAt = (a1, a2, ..., at)
be the corresponding t replies, where t ∈ N and is polynomially bounded. We define Vt
as the view of an adversary (i.e., Serv) over the t queries as the transcript of the interac-
tions between Serv and the involved query issuers, together with some common knowl-
edge. Specifically, Vt = (D′ = (ED, ID), id(d′1), ..., id(d
′
|D′|),U-ComK list, Qt, At).
Following the notation from [8], the trace of the t queries is defined to be: Tt =
(|D′|, id(d′1), ..., id(d′|D′|), Ω(q1), ..., Ω(qt), |UA|), which contains all the information
that we allow the adversary to obtain. Note that |UA| equals the number of entries in the
U-ComK list. A simulation-based definition of query privacy is formally presented as
follows.
Definition 1 (Query Privacy). A multi-user encrypted database system Γ achieves
query privacy if for all database D, for all t ∈ N, for all PPT algorithm A, there
exists a PPT algorithm (the simulator) A∗, such that for all Vt, Tt, for any function f :
|Pr[A(Vt) = f(D,Wt)]− Pr[A∗(Tt) = f(D,Wt)]| < ν(κ)
where the probability is taken over the internal coins of A and A∗.
Intuitively, the notion of query privacy requires that all information on the original
database and the queried keywords that can be computed by Serv from the transcript of
interactions she obtains (i.e., Vt) can also be computed from what it is allowed to know
(i.e. Tt). In other words, a system satisfying query privacy does not leak any information
beyond the information we allow the adversary to have. Note that query privacy implies
record secrecy, i.e. the encrypted database D′ = (ED, ID) does not reveal information
on the original database.
REMARK We stress that in the definition of query privacy, user-server collusion is
not included in our adversarial model. As we argued earlier, this is a practically rational
assumption. On the other hand, from a technical perspective, user-server collusion is
able to comprise any searchable encryption scheme, since the sever can always compare
the access patterns between a target user and the colluding user.
Query Unforgeability In our system, queries issued by user u is generated by her indi-
vidual secret query key, which is distinct to any other user’s query key. It is thus a basic
requirement that neither another user nor the server can generate a legitimate query on
behalf of u. We refer to this property, which is only applicable to the multiple-user set-
ting, as query unforgeability. Query unforgeability allows a query to be uniquely bound
to its issuer in a provable way. Therefore, it is the security basis of other system features,
e.g. accountability and non-repudiation.
To define query unforgeability, we first define the legitimacy of user queries. For a
user u ∈ U , we define u’s legitimate query set asQu = {qu(w)|qu(w)← ConstructQ(qku, w),
w ∈ W}. Namely, a query is user u’s legitimate query if it is indeed constructed by run-
ning ConstructQ with qku. Therefore, an informal meaning of query unforgeability is
that for any user u, no adversary is able to compute q satisfying q ∈ Qu without com-
promising qku.
Query unforgeability is defined based on a game between an adversary and a chal-
lenger. We consider two types of adversaries: malicious users (possibly in a collusion)
and Serv. They have different knowledge and attack capabilities. Let AU be the ad-
versary representing malicious users and AS representing Serv. Let uˆ be the target
user. In AU ’s game, the challenger simulates the execution of Γ and offers an oracle O
which answers AU ’s queries on the executions of Enroll, GenIndex, Write, Search,
and ConstructQ(qkuˆ, ·) which allowsAU to obtain queries on keywords of her choices
with respect to user uˆ3. In AS’s game, she has the knowledge of all users’ complemen-
tary keys and a collection of uˆ’s queries (gathered when uˆ searches the database). Thus
the challenger gives AS the oracle access to ConstructQ(qkuˆ, ·).
The game is the following: the adversary (either AU or AS) first picks her target
user uˆ. Then forAU , she is given the query keys of the remaining users, and she queries
O at her will with the restriction that the number of queries is polynomial-bounded. For
AS , she is given the complementary keys of all users including the target user, and
the oracle access to ConstructQ(qkuˆ, ·). In the end, the adversary halts and returns a
query q. Let Q′uˆ denote the set of uˆ’s queries obtained by the adversary from querying
ConstructQ(qkuˆ, ·). The adversary wins the game if and only if q ∈ Quˆ \ Q′uˆ. The
advantage of the adversary against query unforgeability is defined as the probability of
she winning the game. We summarize the notion of query unforgeability as follows.
Definition 2 (Query Unforgeability). A multi-user encrypted database system Γ achieves
query unforgeability if for any uˆ ∈ U , for all PPT algorithms AU and AS:
Pr[q ∈ Quˆ \Q′uˆ :(kUM , e)← Setup(1κ);
∀u ∈ U (qku, ComKu)← Enroll(kUM , u);
q ← AOU ({qku|u ∈ U \ {uˆ}})
or q ← AConstructQ(qkuˆ,·)S ({ComKu|u ∈ U})
] < ν(κ)
where the probability is taken over the internal coins of AU , AS ,Setup, and Enroll.
REMARK Since each user possesses a distinct query key, it would be a natural re-
quirement to maintain secrecy of query keys, i.e., a query key is only known to its owner.
It is straightforward to observe that if a system is query unforgeable, it also preserves
secrecy of query keys. Otherwise, the knowledge of the target’s query key easily leads
to generating a legitimate query.
Revocability User eviction is an indispensable part of a multi-user application. It is de-
sirable to allowUM to revoke the search capabilities of users who are deemed no longer
appropriate to search the database. Since the incapability of searching the database in-
dexes is implied by the incapability of distinguishing them, we define revocability based
on index indistinguishability.
An adversary’s advantage in attacking revocability is defined as her winning prob-
ability in the following game. The adversary A runs in two stages, A1 and A2: In the
first stage, A1 acts as an authorized user and is allowed to access the oracle O as in
Definition 2. At the end of the first stage, A1 chooses two new keywords w1 and w2,
3 An malicious user may observe uˆ’s queries by attacking her system or the communication
channel.
which have not been queried thus far. Let state represent the knowledge A1 gains dur-
ing the first stage. In the second stage, A2 is revoked, and is given the index of one of
the two keywords.A2 finally outputs a bit b′.A wins the game if and only if b′ = b. We
summarize the notion of revocability as follows.
Definition 3 (Revocability). A multi-user encrypted database query system Γ achieves
revocability if for all PPT algorithms A = (A1,A2):
Pr[b′ = b : (kUM , e)← Setup(1κ);
∀u ∈ UA (qku, ComKu)← Enroll(kUM , u);
(qkA, ComKA)← Enroll(kUM ,A);
(state, w0, w1)← AO1 (qkA);
Revoke(A);
b ∈R {0, 1}, I(wb)← GenIndex(qku, wb;ComKu)u∈RUA ;
b′ ← A2(state, I(wb), w0, w1),
] < 1/2 + ν(κ)
where the probability is taken over the internal coins of A, Setup, Enroll, and the
instance of u.
Intuitively, the definition demands that all successful searches rely on the assistance
from Serv using the corresponding complementary keys. With this feature, UM is
able to efficiently revoke a user by instructing Serv to delete the relevant key.
REMARK The definition of revocability based on the index indistinguishability
addresses the cryptographic strength of the searching protocol. A revoked user might
mount attacks on the system or the communication channel in order to perform a search.
For instance a replayed query may help a revoked user to search the database. We argue
that this type of attacks can be neutralized by deploying secure communication channels
or a user authentication mechanism, which are out of the scope of this paper.
4 Our Construction
4.1 Technical Preliminaries
Pseudorandom Function and Pseudorandom Permutation A pseudorandom function is
a function whose outputs cannot be efficiently distinguished from the outputs of truly
random functions. A keyed cryptographic hash function is often modeled as a pseu-
dorandom function. The main difference between a pseudorandom function and the
random oracle is that the former can be accessed only by the key holder, while the
latter is publicly accessible. If a pseudorandom function is a permutation, then it is
pseudorandom permutation. Symmetric key encryption schemes are often modeled as
pseudorandom permutations.
Bilinear Map Let G1 and G2 be two groups of prime order p. A bilinear map is a
function eˆ : G1 ×G1 → G2, satisfying the following properties:
1. Bilinear: For all g1, g2 ∈ G1 and all x1, x2 ∈ Z∗p , eˆ(gx11 , gx22 ) = eˆ(g1, g2)x1x2 .
2. Non-degenerate: If g is a generator of G1, then eˆ(g, g) is a generator of G2.
3. Computable: eˆ(g1, g2) can be efficiently computed for any g1, g2 ∈ G1.
Note that theG1 is a Gap-Diffie-Hellman group (GDH group), where the Decisional
DH problem (DDH) is easy while the Computational DH problem (CDH) is still hard.
The CDH problem is to compute gab, given g, ga, gb; and the DDH problem is to de-
termine c ?= gab, given g, ga, gb, c, where G is a cyclic group generated by g of prime
order p, c ∈R G, and a, b ∈R Z∗p .
BLS Short Signature Boneh et al. proposed a short signature scheme in [6] based on
bilinear maps. A brief recall of the scheme is as follows: Let G1, G2, eˆ be defined as
the above, and g be a generator of G1; h : {0, 1}∗ → G1 be a collision resistant hash
function. A user’s key pair is (x ∈ Z∗p , y = gx ∈ G1), where x is the private signing
key. Then, the signature on a message m is defined to be σ = h(m)x. Signature verifi-
cation is to check eˆ(g, σ) ?= eˆ(y, h(m)). The BLS short signature achieves existential
un-forgeability if h is modeled as a random oracle.
4.2 Protocol
We now present our construction. Let G1, G2 be two cyclic groups of a prime order p,
and a bilinear map eˆ : G1 × G1 → G2 between them as defined above. Let g be the
generator of G1. Let [m]k denote an encryption of a message m ∈ M under a secure
symmetric encryption scheme with the secret key k ∈ K, where M is the message
domain and K is the domain of the secret key. We use 〈c〉k to denote its decryption.
Let h : G2 → K be a collision-resistant hash function mapping an element in G2
to an element in K, and hs : S × W → G1 be a keyed hash function under a seed
s ∈ S that maps a keyword to an element in G1, where S is the domain of the secret
seeds. The details of our protocol for the multi-user encrypted database system (MuED)
are shown in Figure 1. In this construction, the encryption of records is performed
using a semantically secure symmetric key encryptionE() with the key e. Note that [.]k
and E() can be different symmetric encryption schemes (in fact, [.]k is not necessarily
semantically secure), so we distinguish them for clarity reason.
Note also that while the database server Serv maintains a Com K list, the list is not
intended to enforce access control, or to make any verification on the legitimacy of the
user or the relationship between the user and the complementary key ComKu. Serv
simply uses the complementary key indicated by the querying user in the algorithm of
Search.
4.3 Correctness
The correctness of the protocol is straightforward. Suppose that a record 〈E(di), I(w)〉
is generated by user u, where di.w = w and I(w) = 〈r, [r]k〉. Note that k essentially is
equal to h(eˆ(hs(w), g)x). Consider a user u¯ with a secret key xu¯ and a complementary
key at Serv being ComKu¯. Her query on the keyword w is qu¯(w) = hs(w)xu¯ ; and
the key used in Search is thus k′ = h(eˆ(qu¯(w), ComKu¯)) = h(eˆ(hs(w)xu¯ , g
x
xu¯ )) =
h(eˆ(hs(w), g)x). Since k = k′, E(di) is inserted into the reply set and returned to u¯
Setup(1κ) : UM sets up public system parameters G1, G2, and eˆ; selects x ∈R
Z∗p and assigns kUM = x; selects the random data encryption key e
for E() and a random seed s ∈ S for the keyed hash function hs.
Enroll(kUM , u): UM sets UA = UA ∪ {u}; selects xu ∈R Z∗p and computes
ComKu = g
x
xu ∈ G1; securely sends qku = (xu, s) and e to
user u, and sends ComKu to Serv, who then inserts a new entry
(u,ComKu) to U-ComK.
GenIndex(qku, w;ComKu): To generate an index for keyword w, user u first selects a random
blinding element rw ∈R Z∗p , and computes and sends (u, hs(w)rw )
to Serv. Upon receiving the generate index request, Serv re-
turns ew = eˆ(hs(w)rw , ComKu) to u who then computes k =
h(e
xu/rw
w ) ∈ K, and sets the index for w as I(w) = 〈r, [r]k〉,
where r ∈R M. Outputs I(w).
Write(qku, e, di;ComKu): To write a record di to Serv, user u first generating the index of
di.w (i.e., I(di.w)) by invoking GenIndex(qku, di.w;ComKu).
Then u computes E(di) using e, and passes d′i = 〈E(di), I(di.w)〉
to Serv.
ConstructQ(qku, w): User u computes qu(w) = hs(w)xu and outputs (u, qu(w)) as her
query on the keyword w.
Search(qu(w), ComKu, D′): Serv scans U-ComK to find ComKu. If no result, she out-
puts ⊥. Otherwise, using ComKu, she computes k′ =
h(eˆ(qu(w), ComKu)) and sets aqu(w) = ∅. For each Ii ∈ ID in
the form (A,B), she sets aqu(w) = aqu(w)∪{E(di)} ifA = 〈B〉k′ .
Finally, she returns aqu(w) to user u.
Revoke(u): UM sets UA = UA \ {u} and UR = UR ∪ {u}. Then she instructs
Serv to delete the entry of (u,ComKu) from the U-ComK list.
Fig. 1. The Construction of MuED.
according to the protocol. We remark that since h(·) and hs(·) are collision resistant
hash functions, the probability of computing the same key from two different keywords
are negligible.
4.4 Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security of our protocol, and in particular show that the
construction of MuED in Figure 1 satisfies the security requirements in Section 3.
Query Privacy. We first prove that our protocol achieves query privacy in the fol-
lowing theorem.
Theorem 1. MuED achieves query privacy in Definition 1 if E(·) and [·]k are pseu-
dorandom permutations and hs(·) is a pseudorandom function.
Proof. It suffices for us to construct a PPT simulator A∗ such that for all t ∈ N,
for all PPT adversaries A, all functions f , given the trace of t queries Tt, A∗ can sim-
ulate A(Vt) with non-negligible probability. More specifically, we show that A∗(Tt)
can generate a view V ∗t which is computationally indistinguishable from Vt, the ac-
tual view of A. Recall that Tt = (|D′| = m, 1, ...,m,Ω(q1), ..., Ω(qt), |UA|) and
Vt = (ED = {E(d1), ..., E(dm)}, ID = {I1, ..., Im}, 1, ...,m,U-ComK, Qt, At).
For t = 0 (Qt = ∅, At = ∅),A∗ builds V ∗t = (E∗D = {E(d1)∗, ..., E(dm)∗}, I∗D =
{I∗1 , ..., I∗m}, 1, ...,m,U-ComK∗) as follows. For 1 ≤ i ≤ m, it selects E(di)∗ ∈R
{0, 1}|E(di)|, and sets I∗i = 〈I∗i [1], I∗i [2]〉, where I∗i [1] ∈R M and I∗i [2] ∈R M. To
construct U-ComK∗, for each entryA∗ selects a random user identity and sets the corre-
sponding complementary key as a random element fromG1 (the total number of entries
is |UA|, which is contained in Tt). It is easy to check that V ∗t and Vt are computation-
ally indistinguishable if the symmetric encryption (i.e., used to instantiate E and [·]k) is
pseudorandom permutation. Note that in this proof, we did not consider the process of
generating D′, and assume that D′ is already in place. In fact, the generation of D′ in
MuED does not provide A any additional knowledge on the keywords, since the only
extra information A obtains by observing the generation of D′ is hs(w)rw for each w
(rw ∈R Z∗p ), which clearly is computationally indistinguishable from a random element
from G1.
For t > 0,A∗ builds V ∗t = (E∗D, I∗D, 1, ...,m,U-ComK∗, Q∗t , A∗t ) as follows. To be
general, we suppose that all queries in Qt are from distinct users (recall that the querier
of a query can be seen from Ω(qi)), but some of them may query the same keywords.
For 1 ≤ j ≤ |UA|, it selects x∗j ∈R Z∗p and sets x∗ = x∗1 × ...× x∗|UA|.
– Generating E∗D: Generation of E∗D is the same as in the case of t = 0, where each
E(di)∗ is a random value.
– Generating Q∗t : Recall that from Ω(q1), ..., Ω(qt) contained in Vt, A∗ can deter-
mine which queries ask the same keyword. For eachΩ(qi), it selects a random user
identity u∗i as the querier, and picks up an element from {x∗1, ..., x∗|UA|}, say x∗i , for
u∗i . If there does not exist j < i such thatΩ(qj) = Ω(qi) (note thatΩ(qj) = Ω(qi)
means that qi and qj ask the same keyword), selects a random element rg ∈R G1
and computes q∗i = r
x∗i
g . Otherwise, re-uses the same rg for q∗j to compute q
∗
i .
– Generating U-ComK∗: We actually associate each x∗i with a user in UA. Accord-
ingly, the complementary key corresponding to x∗i is computed as g
x∗/x∗i . To orga-
nize the U-ComK∗, the users together with the corresponding complementary keys
involved in generating Q∗t should be placed to the appropriate positions accord-
ing to Ω(q1), ..., Ω(qt), while the remaining users and complementary keys can be
placed randomly to fill the remaining entries of the list.
– Generating I∗D: From Ω(qi), 1 ≤ i ≤ t, A∗ knows which records are retrieved by
query qi. Recall that forΩ(qi), q∗i is computed as r
x∗i
g . Computes k∗ = h(eˆ(rg, g)x
∗
),
and for each of the records retrieved by qi, the index is set as 〈r ∈RM, [r]k∗〉. At
last, the index of each of the remaining records (i.e., those are not retrieved by Qt)
is set as 〈r1 ∈RM, r2 ∈RM〉.
– GeneratingA∗t : Generation ofA∗t is straightforward.A∗t is simply the set of records
from E∗D whose id’s are contained in Ω(q1), ..., Ω(qt).
We show that V ∗t is computationally indistinguishable from Vt by comparing them
component by component. It is easy to see that ifE is a pseudorandom permutation,E∗D
and ED are computationally indistinguishable. For Q∗t and Qt, let us consider an actual
query qu(w) = hs(w)xu and a simulated query q∗u = r
x∗u
g , where rg ∈R G1: qu(w)
and q∗u are computationally indistinguishable if hs is a pseudorandom function. For
U-ComK∗ and U-ComK, an actual complementary key gx/xu and a simulated comple-
mentary key gx
∗/x∗u is indistinguishable, since xu and x∗u are random values. It is also
not hard to see that I∗D and ID are computationally indistinguishable if [·]k is pseudo-
random permutation. Finally, given the above indistinguishability results, the indistin-
guishability between A∗t and At is straightforward. 2
Query unforgeability. In the following, we prove that our protocol satisfies query
unforgeability.
Theorem 2. If there exists a PPT adversary (either AU or AS) that breaks the
query unforgeability of MuED in Definition 2 with an advantage , then there exists
a PPT adversary B who can succeed in forging BLS short signatures with the same
amount of advantage.
Proof. We prove the theorem relative to AU and AS , respectively. Given a BLS
short signature scheme as specified in Section 4.1, where x is the secret signing key and
y is the public key. Let B be a PPT adversary attempting to forge a short signature with
respect to y.
CASE 1 (ForAU ): Intuitively,AU obtains a set of queriesQ = {hs(w1)xuˆ , hs(w2)xuˆ , ...}
of the target user uˆ through the ConstructQ(qkuˆ, ·) oracle. Note that since AU knows
s, hs cannot be modeled as a pseudorandom function; rather, it is modeled as a ran-
dom oracle. As a result, these queries are essentially the BLS short signatures under the
signing key xuˆ. IfA computes hs(w)xuˆ from Q, it clearly forges a signature on w. The
detail of the proof follows.
The proof involves constructing BO(x)(Desc(O(x))), on input of Desc(O(x))
which is a description of an instance of the BLS short signature scheme, and is pro-
vided the signing oracle O(x). Note that Desc(O(x)) includes g ∈ G1, the public key
y = gx, hash function h used in the signature scheme, eˆ : G1×G1 → G2, and possibly
other parameters describing the scheme. The main idea is to set the signing key x to be
the secret query key of the target user. As such, the most challenging part of the simu-
lation is that if kUM is selected randomly as in the original protocol construction, we
have difficulty in computing the complementary key of the target user, which should
be gkUM/x, since we only know gx. The trick we have is to let B choose kUM in a
“controlled” way, but AU does not detect the difference. Specifically, the details of the
simulation are as follows.
1. Setup: In setting up the system, B uses G1, G2, eˆ of the BLS short signature
scheme as system parameters. B then selects a random seed s and a random data
encryption key e. To generate kUM , B chooses a set X = {x1, ..., xj , ...xmax},
where xj ∈R Z∗p and max is the maximum number of user in the system which is









xj ∈ G1. Note that B actually does not need to know the discrete logarithm
of kUM .
2. Enroll: To enroll users in U to the system, B assigns a random element from X to
a user as the query key. In particular, for each ui ∈ U \ {uˆ}, chooses a distinct
xi ∈ X , and sets (qkui , ComKui) = ((xi, s), yx1...xi−1xi+1...x|X|). for the target




(as a result, x = xuˆ is a component of qkuˆ, which
B tries to compute); B then gives qkui , ui ∈ U \ {uˆ}, together with e to AU .
3. AnswerO queries: B needs to answer the following types of queries fromAU : En-
roll, GenIndex, Write, Search, and ConstructQ(qkuˆ, ·). It should be clear that B
can trivially answer the queries of Enroll, GenIndex, Write Search, because she
has the correct complementary keys of all users. We thus focus on how B answers
ConstructQ(qkuˆ, ·) queries. AU can ask for queries on keywords of her choice
constructed using the target user’s query key. To answer a ConstructQ(qkuˆ, ·)
query, B resorts to its oracle O(x): on receiving a keyword w, B submits the word
to O(x); on getting the reply from O(x), B tests the validity of the reply using
the verification algorithm of the signature scheme. If it is not valid, B continues
to query O(x) until gets a valid reply. B then returns to AU the reply it gets from
O(x). Note that implicitly,O(x) simulates the random oracle h(·), and provides the
oracle access to B. Moreover, sinceAU knows s, B needs to simulates hs(·) toAU .
To simulate hs(·), B uses the oracle h(·) fromO(x): in particular, whenever getting
a message fromAU querying hs(·), B asks the same message to h(·), and returns to
AU what is returned from O(x). As a result, the set of {hs(w1)xuˆ , hs(w2)xuˆ , ...}
obtained by AU is actually {h(w1)xuˆ , h(w2)xuˆ , ...}, which is a set of the BLS sig-
natures.
4. B finally outputs what AU outputs.
CASE 2 (For AS): The proof is similar to Case 1. To avoid redundancy, we only
highlight the differences between two proofs. AS also obtains a set of queries Q =
{hs(w1)xuˆ , hs(w2)xuˆ , ...} of the target user uˆ through the ConstructQ(qkuˆ, ·) oracle,
butAS does not know the seed s. This intuitively suggests that forging a query is much
harder forAS than forAU . In the actual proof, B does not choose s at all in Setup (the
trick is actually that B does not use any key for the hash function). Moreover, B does
not providesAS the oracle access to hs(·), sinceAS does not know s and thus does not
have access to hs(·).
The simulation by B is perfect in both cases. It is obvious that if q on w output by
AU or AS is a legitimate query of the target user uˆ, then q must be equal to h(w)xuˆ ,
which is a valid BLS short signature on w. This completes the proof. 2
Revocability. The following theorem establishes that the construction of MuED
satisfies revocability.
Theorem 3. MuED achieves revocability in Definition 3 if [·]k is a secure encryption
scheme.
Proof. The proof is pretty straightforward, and we only state the intuition behind
the proof. The indexes of the two keywords w1 and w2 are I(w1) = 〈r1, [r1]k(w1)〉 and
I(w2) = 〈r2, [r2]k(w2)〉, where r1, r2 ∈R M, and k(w1) and k(w2) denote the secret
keys generated fromw1 andw2, respectively. Since the complementary key of a revoked
user is deleted from the U-ComK list, the revoked user can never get k(w1) and k(w2)
from the keywords and the query key it has; moreover, it cannot get the keys either if
[·]k is a secure encryption scheme that does not expose the encryption key. As a result,
I(w1) and I(w2) are independent of w1 and w2, respectively, from the perspective of
the revoked user. So the advantage of the adversary guessing the correct bit cannot be
significantly more than 1/2. 2
4.5 Performance
We focus on the online query process, as other procedures (algorithms) have constant
computational overhead. For query issuance, the main computation at the user side is
simply an exponentiation operation. Thus its computational complexity is O(1). For a
query process, the main computation at the server side includes a pairing operation, and
n symmetric key decryption, where n is the number of records. Thus the computational
complexity is asymptoticallyO(n). Note that all existing single-user searchable encryp-
tion schemes except those in [8] require O(n) server computation. This suggests that
the searching efficiency of our protocol does not downgrade due to supporting multiple
users.
The computation cost of [8] is linear to the size of the keyword set, instead of the
document set. This performance gain is due to a preprocessing of all documents so that
the index of a keyword links together all relevant documents. However, it introduces
more cost in document deletion or insertion. An optimization approach for our scheme
is for the server to group the records retrieved by a reply together by sharing a com-
mon index (since they contain the same keyword). It saves the server from repetitively
searching the same keyword. As the system proceeds, this can greatly reduce the server
computation overhead.
5 Conclusion
Existing efforts on searchable encryption have focused on single-user settings. Directly
extending a searchable encryption scheme for the single-user setting to the multi-user
setting has several downsides, e.g., the considerable costs associated with re-distributing
query keys and re-generating the encrypted database. To solve theses problems, in this
paper we presented a systematic study on searchable encryption under a practical multi-
user database setting. We first formulated a system model as well as a set of security
requirements, then presented a concrete construction which provably satisfies those re-
quirements. In our construction, each user employs a distinct key, and consequently,
user revocation does not entail updating of query keys and re-encryption of the database,
and is transparent to the non-revoked users. Moreover, each authorized user can also in-
sert and search the database, an important feature to data sharing in the multi-user set-
ting. Our construction is efficient, achieving similar performance as most of the existing
single-user schemes.
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